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Globally, the displacement of persons is reaching record numbers, including millions of 
refugees seeking safety outside of their native countries. The existing literature on factors 
of successful refugee settlement lacks specific quantitative analysis, and most of the 
available information on the role of culture is limited to psychological and social 
research. I expect that large perceived differences in the culture of the refugee and the 
culture of the country in which they settle will cause a combination of xenophobic public 
responses and restrictive government policies, and therefore will be negatively related to 
successful social integration of those refugees. I assess the role of culture in settlement by 
analyzing quantitatively the relationship between cultural distance - the gap between the 
culture of the refugee and the culture of the country in which they settle - and successful 
settlement in society. I expect that cultural distance will be negatively associated with 
achievement of legal status. I also analyze prominent refugee crises between the late 
1970s and 2016 to qualitatively assess the role of culture in integration. The case study 
section discusses the history, cultural factors, and integration of Syrian refugees in 
Germany, Venezuelan refugees in Colombia, Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, and 
refugees from El Salvador to the United States. I find that cultural distance is negatively 
associated with education, employment, and sanitation of living conditions, and 
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Introduction 
How and to what extent does the difference between the culture of a refugee and 
the culture of the country they settle in affect the successful social integration and 
settlement of the refugee? “Refugees” refers to a specifically classified type of migrant, 
legally defined by the 1951 Refugee Convention as:  
“someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group, or political opinion.”1  
Refugees are often suddenly uprooted from their homes and undergo significant 
change in their lives. They have to learn and adapt to live in the cultural context of the 
country in which they settle. Residents of countries where refugees settle experience this 
change from the other perspective, watching their country’s demographics change, 
sometimes very quickly and dramatically. Thus, culture affects many aspects of behavior 
and thinking, providing a cognitive reference point for perceiving the world and making 
choices. Culture also provides a sense of identity and a distinction between who is “us” 
and who is “them.” 
Often, countries accepting refugees find themselves overwhelmed and lack 
sufficient infrastructure to accommodate them, leading to a difficult and strained 
transition for all parties involved. There are a wide variety of factors that may influence 
this transition period and affect the ability of refugees to successfully integrate into their 
new country of residence. I expect that large differences in the culture of the refugee and 
the culture of the country in which they settle causes a combination of xenophobic public 
 
1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees,” 1951, 3. 
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responses and restrictive government policies, and therefore is negatively related to 
successful settlement of those refugees. This study demonstrates how culture acts as a 
factor affecting refugee settlement.  
Nationalism and radical right political groups have gained traction in recent years, 
advocating for restrictive border policies and often promoting xenophobic views of 
refugees and migrants. These groups have the power to influence public policy or frame 
the issue and can bring about lower acceptance rates and poorer treatment of refugees, as 
well as less legal protections for them. Nationalism comes from a sociocultural identity 
that can be constructed based on language, race, religion, and more. Changing 
demographics can create a cultural shock that challenges this sense of identity, resulting 
in protective and isolationist responses. 
Migration is on the rise worldwide as a result of conflict, climate change, political 
instability, and poverty. Migration and refugees are inherently global, cross-border issues, 
yet states must individually decide on their policy responses. When it comes to refugees, 
international law is also involved, providing specific protections. Furthermore, 
international organizations like the United Nations (UN) and humanitarian groups are 
present in various capacities to provide guidance and support for refugees and for states. 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is specifically tasked 
with protecting refugees and aiding them in the resettlement process. The issue of refugee 
integration is thus politically important at the state and international level, involving 
multiple actors and overlapping policy areas and affecting the global movement of 
people. 
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Policymakers in those countries to which refugees flee have a vested interest in 
the successful integration of refugees. Refugees can provide a labor force and bring their 
own skills and education to a country. Refugee policy is very visible on the international 
stage, and policymakers must consider the image that their refugee policy projects to 
other nations and to domestic constituents. Policies to accommodate refugees in the long-
term can put a strain on national resources, but short-term policies are inefficient and fail 
to integrate refugees. Policymakers must identify not only the most politically viable 
response but also the most effective in order to mitigate potential future problems. 
Refugee integration is relevant and currently the subject of much academic study, 
with the number of people displaced due to conflict rising. Refugee flows involve policy 
at every level; international, national, regional, and local. There is little consensus on 
what the most effective policies are or what should be done internationally to most 
efficiently aid refugees, and data on refugees remains limited. There are many interesting 
cases of refugee flows and state responses, which vary widely in outcomes and have 
complex historical backgrounds. Academically, the study of refugees is not new, but the 
scope and depth of analysis is increasing. 
The idea that cultural factors influence refugee or migrant settlement has been 
explored in sociology and political science, yet there is no agreed-upon set of factors that 
are known to influence settlement in certain ways. The way a country responds to 
refugees is intrinsically linked not only to culture and national identity, but also to 
history, geography, and current events. Furthermore, policy responses change over time 
and can have mixed outcomes. Countries are also constrained by their limited capacity to 
accept refugees and to accommodate them in society. Researchers are constrained by the 
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limits of the existing data, as collection of data concerning refugees is done inconsistently 
by the state and non-governmental organizations. Additionally, refugees’ choices are 
constrained by the circumstances in which they find themselves. This field of research is 
clearly complex, yet in need of development. It is highly salient to decisions and policy 
that could improve the outcomes for the receiving countries and the refugee populations. 
The thesis is organized as follows. In the first section, I present the literature 
review and important key concepts, including social identity theory, acculturation, and 
cultural distance. In section two, I present my theory, which asserts that cultural distance 
determines refugee integration at both the group and state level. Social identity theory 
supports the use of the characteristics of the refugees as the main explanatory factor. I 
present two hypotheses, one focusing on state-level legal integration and one focusing on 
group-level social integration. In the third section, I discuss my research design. This 
thesis is based on mixed-method research including quantitative analysis substantiated by 
qualitative case studies. These case studies include the Syrian refugees in Germany, 
Venezuelan refugees in Colombia, Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, and refugees from 
El Salvador to the United States. In the fourth section, I present my analysis and results 
and finally, in section five, I offer my conclusions. 
Literature Review 
 Given the importance and stakes of refugee policy, much research exists on this 
topic. A large amount has been written on the psychological and sociological processes 
involved. Political scientists have conducted research as well, though there is little written 
on why refugees are or aren’t successful and on the effect of culture. There is also a lack 
of quantitative research compared to the more common qualitative research on particular 
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national or regional refugee situations. The main themes I identified in the relevant 
literature are social identity theory, the attitude of the host country, acculturation and 
integration, the attitudes of refugees, and the role of policy. 
Social Identity Theory 
Social identity theory focuses on the identity of the migrants as the key factor 
influencing the reaction of the host country. Sniderman, Louk, and Prior note that the 
national identity of the immigrant is the most important factor to predict an exclusionary 
reaction, more than economic considerations or perceived threats to safety.2 This is 
important, as many political considerations for refugee policies rhetorically prioritize 
these economic or safety concerns. The authors asked Dutch respondents whether or not 
they thought it was good for a new group of immigrants to come, based on either 
economic or cultural traits such as their ability to speak Dutch and to ‘fit in’ with Dutch 
culture, and the cultural traits were much more important.3 This research supports the 
idea that with refugees, as with immigrants, the social identity (or culture) of the refugee 
is the key factor eliciting a negative response, rather than security or the economy. 
Additional research supports social identity theory as it pertains to migrants, with 
a study of American prejudice towards Cuban, Mexican, and Asian immigrants. It 
assesses not only realistic and symbolic threats, but also intergroup anxiety and negative 
stereotyping.4 According to the authors, symbolic threats represent in-group values and a 
sense of superiority over others, which would correlate to social identity theory in that the 
 
2 Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, “Predisposing factors and situational triggers: Exclusionary reactions 
to immigrant minorities,” 35. 
3 Ibid., 43. 
4 Stephan, Ybarra and Bachman, “Prejudice Toward Immigrants 1,” 2222. 
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group identity is the primary determinant.5 Symbolic threat and hostilities stem from 
perceptions that the out-group has values that threaten or contradict in-group values.6 
Thus, group identity and perceptions of identity and cultural values affect the prejudice 
exhibited by those in the country of settlement. Importantly, the authors also found that 
the salience of symbolic threat is reduced if the two groups have friendly past 
relationships, positive contact, extensive knowledge about each other, etc.7 This is what I 
will attempt to capture using qualitative case study analysis. 
Even the effect of the media is framed by social identity. Media has a framing and 
gatekeeping effect on public opinion, setting the agenda of what issues are important as 
well as how they are discussed. Therefore, the media has the ability to prime the public to 
have strong positive or negative opinions on immigration. According to Brader, 
Valentino, and Suhay, ethnic cues influence emotional reactions to media coverage of 
migration, and even when the costs of immigration are portrayed identically, hostility is 
elicited according to ethnic group cues.8 The authors write that anxiety triggers 
opposition of newcomers based on how different they are, and migration discourse is 
group-centric.9 This supports social identity theory and shows that culture and identity 
matter even given the perceptions framed by the media. 
Attitude of the Host Country 
 The attitude of the public within the host country is important in the way that it 
shapes the experience of refugees seeking asylum in that country. In Germany, media-
 
5 Stephan, Ybarra and Bachman, “Prejudice Toward Immigrants 1,” 2222. 
6 Ibid., 2223. 
7 Ibid., 2232. 
8 Ibid., 975. 
9 Brader, Valentino and Suhay, “What triggers public opposition to immigration? Anxiety, group cues, and 
immigration threat,” 960. 
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shaped discourse was shaped by moral norms and the historical-cultural context of 
Germany.10 Merkel’s policies embraced refugees, explicitly encouraging a “culture of 
welcome,” or “Willkommenskultur;” however, there was a social and political backlash 
leading to the rise of the xenophobic Alternative for Germany party. Conrad and 
Aðalsteinsdóttir write that a social constructivist viewpoint helps explain this reaction as 
an attitude shaped by national identity and historical context.11   
Furthermore, migration has a multidimensional nature, meaning that immigrants’ 
decisions in where they choose to settle are influenced by different types of feedback 
from potential countries of settlement, while these potential countries of settlement in 
turn may be discouraged from accepting refugees due to various factors.12 This two-way 
street involves the ideas that each group holds about themselves and each other. 
Miholjcic argues that norms and ideas such as xenophobia and intolerance of ethnic 
diversity rooted in history can negatively affect settlement.13 Segal confirms that both the 
perspective of the migrant and the perspective of transit and destination countries are 
important to understanding how refugees settle.14  
Segal adds that ethnicity often contributes to and challenges the world view of the 
receiving state, which has implications for the societies in which refugees settle, 
including implications for the delivery of services important to refugees.15 Quantitative 
research supports the idea that cognitive factors primarily predict attitudes towards 
 
10 Conrad and Aðalsteinsdóttir, “Understanding Germany’s Short-lived ‘Culture of Welcome’: Images of 
Refugees in Three Leading German Quality Newspapers,” 1-2. 
11 Ibid., 1-2. 
12 Miholjcic, “What Is Preventing Successful Immigrant Integration in the Central and Eastern European 
Societies?” 15. 
13 Ibid., 21-22. 
14 Segal, “Globalization, Migration, and Ethnicity,” 136. 
15 Ibid., 135. 
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asylum seekers, and affective factors are secondary predictors.16 This is important to 
show that cognitive factors - beliefs formed about a particular group, including prejudice 
based on perception threat and competition - affect attitudes towards refugees more than 
other factors such as personal experience or feelings.17 
Group-level analysis shows that out-group/in-group dynamics, which can be 
related to cultural differences and prejudices, are also of importance in shaping the 
attitudes people hold towards refugees.18 Attitude towards refugees can be explained by 
studying holistically the combinations of cognitive, affective, and behavioral factors.19 
Such research has concluded that cognitive factors primarily predict attitudes towards 
asylum seekers, and affective factors are secondary predictors.20 
Acculturation and Integration 
 John Berry provides foundational work on the acculturation of migrants. 
Acculturation as Berry defines it concerns “the cultural changes resulting from these 
group encounters.”21 In 1997, he wrote on the question: what happens to individuals, who 
have developed in one cultural context, when they attempt to live in a new cultural 
context?22 According to this work, the cultural characteristics of the country of origin and 
of the country of settlement matter, at both the group and individual level.23 Berry 
specifically denotes the difference between two cultures as “cultural distance.”24  
 
16 Segal, “Globalization, Migration, and Ethnicity,” 243. 
17 Ibid., 238. 
18 Croucamp, O’Connor, Pedersen, and Breen, “Predicting Community Attitudes towards Asylum Seekers: 
A Multi-Component Model,” 580. 
19 Ibid., 243. 
20 Ibid., 238. 
21 Berry, “Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation,” 6. 
22 Ibid., 6. 
23 Ibid., 15. 
24 Ibid., 16. 
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Phillimore later builds on Berry’s work on acculturation, and finds that personal, 
cultural, policy and experiential factors combine to influence settlement experiences, 
potentially causing psychosocial stress that impacts refugees’ levels of integration.25 
Phillimore found that refugees’ ability to integrate were negatively affected by 
experiences at the time of arrival, such as the asylum process and poor-quality 
accommodations, and by experiences during the process of trying to settle and integrate, 
such as lack of employment opportunity and poor health care services (coupled with 
psychological needs such as post-traumatic stress disorder).26 Thus, Phillimore discusses 
integration in terms of their legal and social opportunities, which I will later build upon in 
my definition of integration. 
Cultural distance comes up again in Campbell’s work on genocide. Campbell 
refers to cultural distance as “cultural diversity, or differences in the content of culture.”27 
According to Campbell, cultural distance is necessary but not sufficient for genocide, and 
genocide will be greater in conflicts between more culturally distant ethnic groups.28 
Group-level attitudes towards refugees are affected by the level of cultural distance, and a 
higher distance will lead to increased conflict and lower ability to integrate. While this 
research is focused on genocide rather than social conflict and integration, the lessons 
may be applicable; this research supports the general idea that high cultural distance 
decreases successful integration of one group into another through the mechanism of 
higher conflict. Campbell’s work supports my group-level theory and my use of cultural 
distance as a variable. 
 
25 Phillimore, “Refugees, Acculturation Strategies, Stress and Integration,” 578.  
26 Ibid., 577-578. 
27 Campbell, “Genocide as Social Control,” 161. 
28 Ibid., 162. 
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Attitudes of Refugees 
It is important to consider the agency and perspective of refugees and migrants, 
not only as people that happened to move from one location to another. Based on the 
extensive records kept by the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Office of 
Refugee Resettlement, refugees choose where to settle based on different factors than 
non-refugee immigrants.29 Immigrants as a whole tend to settle where other immigrants 
are, but refugees are sensitive to welfare generosity.30  
A study conducted in 2003 emphasizes the lack of research done on the 
perspective of the targets, and asks, how do refugees experience prejudice against 
foreigners living in South Africa? South African refugees believed that the main reason 
for the anti-foreigner sentiment they experienced as resulting from the view that 
foreigners are perceived to be prospering illegitimately in South Africa.31 This perception 
of resource scarcity, influenced by the culture created by a history of Apartheid, created a 
hostile situation for refugees. Resource scarcity provides a different explanation than the 
idea of national security threat as a discursive reason for xenophobia.32  
The Role of Policy 
 Government policy may be shaped by perceived cultural distance and the attitude 
of constituents within the country of settlement. Policies shape refugee identities, 
stereotypes and interactions in ways that affect “community welcome.”33 In particular, 
integration is supported by naturalization policies which can provide economic and social 
 
29 Zavodny, “Determinants of Recent Immigrants Locational Choices,” 1017. 
30 Ibid., 1014. 
31 Warner and Finchelescu, “Living with Prejudice: Xenophobia and Race,” 43. 
32 Ibid., 42. 
33 Laurentsyeva and Venturini, “The Social Integration of Immigrants and the Role of Policy--A Literature 
Review,” 267.  
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opportunities for immigrants.34 Large differences between immigrants and the native 
population along sociocultural dimensions have been found to make social integration 
more of a challenge, and therefore the determinants of social integration should be 
understood in terms of policies.35 
Hynie finds that successful integration requires a social context that leads to 
inclusion and participation, which can be supported or hindered by appropriate policies at 
the local, regional, national, and international levels.36 State policy affects discourse, as 
refugee situations are often framed either in terms of national security and public safety 
or in terms of humanitarianism or human rights.37 Policy also determines the ability of 
refugees to apply for and obtain legal status, and the rights and opportunities available to 
people of various legal statuses. 
Bogen and Marlowe propose policies be put in place to support social work to 
advocate for asylum-seekers and to change the discourse around them.38 They conduct an 
analysis of policies put forward by the New Zealand government starting in 2013 and of  
the relationship between state policy and the UNHCR policies put in place for refugees.39 
Using five criteria to define the attitude of the host country - concern, hostility, 
consensus, disproportionality, and volatility - the authors conclude that New Zealand 
 
34 Laurentsyeva and Venturini, “The Social Integration of Immigrants and the Role of Policy--A Literature 
Review,” 289-290. 
35 Ibid., 285. 
36 Hynie, “Refugee Integration: Research and Policy,” 273-274. 
37 Ibid., 108. 
38 Bogen and Marlowe, “Asylum Discourse in New Zealand: Moral Panic and a Culture of Indifference,” 
105-110. 
39 Ibid., 105-110. 
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does not have an attitude of moral panic concerning refugees, but that continued policy 
may encourage that attitude.40 
Summary 
 There is significant psychosocial research on how refugees integrate into a host 
country, with an emphasis on social identity theory. Social identity theory supports the 
idea that the characteristics - such as ethnicity and culture - of the migrant are the key 
motivator behind the response of the general public. It is also evident that attitudes on 
both sides are important to successful integration, as is the policy context. These factors 
all appear interconnected, but their exact relationship is complicated to define. Thus, 
social identity theory forms the basis of my research – the idea that the migrant’s 
identities can have an impact on how well they are received by others. 
There is a lack of quantitative research and of political science research 
concerning factors that affect how refugees generally integrate, although much has been 
written by political scientists on the role of policy. Many studies are regionally or 
nationally focused and qualitative in nature. My research addresses these limitations by 
providing a qualitative, cross-national study of factors affecting refugee integration. 
Theory 
My research question is, how and to what extent does the difference between the 
culture of a refugee and the culture of the country they settle in affect the successful 
integration of the refugee? I expect that large differences in the culture of the refugee and 
the culture of the country in which they settle will cause a combination of xenophobic 
 
40 Bogen and Marlowe, “Asylum Discourse in New Zealand: Moral Panic and a Culture of Indifference,” 
106-107. 
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public responses and restrictive government policies, and therefore will be negatively 
related to successful settlement of those refugees. 
Refugees constitute a highly vulnerable group, often without financial resources, 
stable housing, or any certainty about the future. Refugees often seek asylum from 
political oppression, such as genocide and state-sponsored violence. States are bound 
under international law to provide certain protections to refugees that have been granted 
asylum status; however, the method of determining this status varies from state to state. 
This is different from other forms of migration, as migrants can be any person moving 
between countries. Migrants, in contrast to refugees, are not a defined group protected by 
international law.41 
I draw upon social identity theory, which asserts that a migrant’s social identity, 
including their nationality or ethnicity, is the key determinant for the reactions of the 
country of settlement. National identity, more than any other perceived economic or 
security threat, causes people to react with restrictive and exclusionary policies.42 This 
theory supports the relevance of the country of origin when attempting to explain 
negative reactions to refugees. The perspective of this research is focused on the 
characteristics of the refugee, as opposed to other research perspectives focusing on 
media narratives, crime and national security, or perceptions of economic threats. 
John Berry defines cultural distance as “how dissimilar the two cultures are in 
language, religion etc.,” or essentially how different two cultures are from each other.43 I 
expect that a high cultural distance will be associated with poorer indicators for 
 
41 “UNHCR Asylum and Migration,” 2019. 
42 Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, “Predisposing factors and situational triggers: Exclusionary reactions 
to immigrant minorities,” 35. 
43 Berry, “Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation,” 23. 
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successful integration: lower employment rates, lower rates of legal status, less 
enrollment in education, and lower access to sanitation. Large perceived differences in 
the culture of the refugee and the culture of the country in which they settle will cause a 
combination of xenophobic public responses and restrictive government policies, and 
therefore will be negatively related to successful social integration of those refugees.  
Perceptions of cultural distance affect integration at both the group and the state 
level. The process of acculturation involves the changes that occur when two differing 
cultures interact.44 At the group level, high cultural distance will encourage “us-vs-them” 
attitudes and in-group/out-group behaviors among the population of the host country, 
creating a hostile environment not conducive to smooth integration (as opposed to a 
welcoming environment). Xenophobic incidents will function as a measure of this group 
attitude. At the state level, politicians will respond to the changes in attitude and behavior 
of their constituents and to perceived socioeconomic strain or security threats by adopting 
policies that are less oriented towards long-term social integration, including policies 
which restrict the number of refugees accepted and policies which prevent access to legal 
status and therefore the legal opportunities available to refugees. I expect that, if there is a 
higher cultural distance, then there will be higher levels of xenophobia, legislation will be 
less conducive to long-term integration, and these mechanisms will cause the refugees to 
experience less successful integration. 
I define refugee settlement according to the work on acculturation and integration 
presented by Berry and Phillimore. Successful settlement is contingent on the legal 
integration and the social integration of the refugee, which may overlap or be tied to one 
 
44 Phillimore, “Refugees, Acculturation Strategies, Stress and Integration,” 578. 
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another. Legal integration involves policy and occurs at the state level; legal integration 
includes policy to provide legal status for refugees, to provide assistance or barriers to 
entry to the country, and to determine the types of activities that refugees of different 
legal statuses can pursue (such as employment).  
Social integration involves the actions of the population and occurs at the group 
level. Social integration can be measured by xenophobia and incidents of hate speech or 
violence against refugees – or the lack thereof – and prejudiced beliefs about the 
personality or intellect of refugees, which are driven by out-group/in-group thinking and 
are reflected by exclusion of refugees from integration into aspects of society. Social and 
legal integration may be tied together in areas like employment and education, but social 
integration can be differentiated by looking at how refugees are actually willing and able 
to participate in legal activities/opportunities. In Chart 1, I demonstrate the causal 





H1: If there is a higher cultural distance, then refugees will experience less 
successful integration by legal measures. 
I expect that, at the state level, governments that are faced with an influx of 
refugees that do not speak the language and have different religions and customs will 
provide less public resources to refugees and implement legislation focused on short-term 
management rather than long-term settlement. This might involve implementing 
increased border security or decreasing acceptance rates of asylum applicants. 
Meanwhile, when refugees have more cultural similarities, I would expect that the 
government will enact more policies to encourage employment, education, legal status 
and long-term housing. For example, countries in which legislators seek to discourage 
refugees from entering and staying might set up temporary refugee camps, whereas 
countries where legislators seek to integrate refugees into society might provide legal 
status and access to housing. I assess this hypothesis with the quantitative analysis. 
H2:  If there is a higher cultural distance, then refugees will experience less 
successful integration by social measures.  
I expect that, at the group level, the populace of a country in which refugees that 
are entering the country have much different cultures will react with in-group/out-group 
behavior and general xenophobia. In contrast, refugees that speak the language, share the 
same religion, and/or have similar customs will not cause high levels of xenophobia 
among the population in which they are settling, because there are less factors to 
differentiate the groups. I expect that refugees settling in a state with a very different 
19 
culture will not successfully achieve employment at similar rates to the rest of the 
country, will live in a lower quality housing situation with low access to sanitation, and 
enroll in public education at lower rates. I assess this hypothesis with case study analysis. 
Research Design 
 I conduct a mixed-methods study to include both quantitative statistical analysis 
and qualitative case studies. Specifically, I use the nested analysis strategy of conducting 
large-N statistical analysis, then selecting cases for small-N, in-depth investigation. 
Nested analysis as a tool for comparative research in political analysis is based on the 
premise that combining the two approaches improves the quality of measurement and the 
confidence in the findings, while also better analyzing rival explanations.45 It involves a 
preliminary large-N analysis to assess the robustness of the results, then proceeding to 
small-N analysis. The statistical analysis is meant to assess as many of the hypotheses as 
is possible with available data; here, the data limitations only allow for statistical analysis 
to test hypothesis 1 – that high cultural distance will lead to less successful refugee 
integration by legal measures. 
Meanwhile, the case study analysis uses a small number of cases to assess the 
questions left unanswered by the statistical analysis.46 The case studies attempt to test 
hypothesis 2 – that cultural distance will lead to less successful refugee integration by 
social measures – and make up for data limitations by providing context and assessing 
potential rival explanations. This nested analysis addresses the lack of quantitative 
analysis on this subject, while dealing with data limitations and accounting for historical 
 
45 Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed Method Strategy for Comparative Research,” 436. 
46 Ibid., 440. 
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and contextual factors. The quantitative analysis first determines the effect of cultural 
distance on causing restrictive policy responses which inhibit successful legal integration, 
then the case study analysis holistically addresses how cultural distance affects social 
integration of refugees for four cases. 
Quantitative Data 
 My population is all states that have experienced any incoming asylum seekers or 
that are the country of origin of asylum seekers, as recorded by the UNHCR in 2018.47 I 
removed from my population any cases with unknown numbers or zero asylum 
applicants. I also removed cases in which either the country of settlement or of origin are 
countries not included in the World Values Survey (WVS). That left 609 unique cases. 
The unit of analysis is country-year, where each case constitutes the refugee flow from 
one specific country to another specific country in 2018. For example, one case is of all 
Ghanaian refugees to Australia in 2018, for which the UNHCR recorded the total number 
of refugees, the number of refugees who applied for asylum, and the decisions made on 
those asylum applications. I use an OLS regression with fixed effects for country. 
Independent Variable 
The independent variable is a continuous numerical value representing cultural 
distance, where a larger number represents a higher cultural distance. Based on the 
precedent set by Inglehart and Welzel, I measure cultural distance using data from the 
WVS.48 I use the most recent data from Wave 6, conducted between 2010 and 2014. I 
add the distance between the means of both emancipative and secular values of the 
 
47 “Asylum Seekers (Refugee Status Determination),” n.d. 
48 Inglehart and Welzel, “Changing Mass Priorities: The Link Between Modernization and Democracy,” 
554. 
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country of asylum and the country of origin. For example, Germany has a cultural 
distance of 0.4 from Iraq, and a distance of 0.12 from the US.49 
Emancipative refers to a type of self-expression value, which emphasizes freedom 
of choice and equal opportunity, such as gender equality, liberty, and personal autonomy. 
Secular values are more liberal, with less importance to traditional values and wider 
acceptance of things like divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide.50 Traditional values 
are the opposite of secular values and are indicated by low secular scores. Traditional 
countries are more conservative, emphasizing religion, traditional family roles, deference 
to authority, and nationalism. I chose emancipative and secular values because they 
provide data for most countries and each capture the most general level of cultural 
aspects. 
Dependent Variable 
My dependent variable is the rejection rates of asylum seekers. The dependent 
variable is based on the UNHCR data. The UNHCR captures the country of origin, 
country of residence or asylum, the number of applicants in a year, and the number 
recognized and in what way, rejected, or otherwise closed, as well as the total pending at 
the end of the year and the total number of decisions made that year.51  Because of the 
variety of ways a case can be closed, left pending, or recognized, I use the number of 
rejected applicants out of the total number of decisions made on asylum applications that 
year. This continuous numerical value will be used for the dependent variable measuring 
unsuccessful integration, as refugees without legal status can be said to have poorer 
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prospects for integration than refugees with legal status. This variable is not wholly 
representative of integration and only shows one facet of policy, but reliable cross-
country data for other social indicators has not been collected for enough of these cases. 
Rejection will demonstrate restrictive policies by lawmakers and will approximate poor 
legal integration of refugees. Low rejection rates indicate more acceptance of refugees 
and more willingness to provide legal status. I therefore expect that higher cultural 
distance will lead to higher rejection rates. 
Control Variable 
I control for GDP (per capita, PPP) of countries of asylum, using data from the 
World Bank.52 This is an important control because the wealth of the country receiving 
refugees will affect their capacity to accept refugees. If a country is receiving refugees of 
similar culture, but their infrastructure and resources are overwhelmed, that will 
negatively impact the decisions about how many refugees to accept and what legal and 
social resources to provide, therefore prohibiting successful integration of the refugees. 
Additionally, the countries of asylum are not homogenous; while many are large 
countries with extensive resources, some are not. Controlling for GDP ensures that any 
results take into account the possibility that financial capacity can outweigh cultural 
distance as a determinant of integration.  
Case Studies 
In addition to this quantitative analysis, I conduct a qualitative case study of 
refugee flows in four pairs of countries. For this, the cases are: Syrian refugees in 
Germany, Venezuelan refugees in Colombia, Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, and 
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refugees from El Salvador to the United States. These four pairs are good because they 
include a broad geographic area - Latin, Central, and North America, South Asia, Europe, 
and the Middle East. They also each represent different types of refugee crises: 
Venezuela is experiencing political and economic turmoil, Syria continues to face an 
ongoing war, countries in the Northern Triangle have high levels of gang violence, and 
the Rohingya in Myanmar are fleeing ethno-religious violence. Finally, the countries of 
asylum present variety in wealth to help control for the effect of GDP: the United States 
and Germany are highly developed, while Colombia and Bangladesh are developing. By 
employing case-based pattern finding, I analyze these four cases to show how cultural 
distance is realized and influences refugee integration. The cases I include are diverse but 
show common processes, which I highlight in my research.  
For each case, I research the history and origin of the refugee crisis itself. I then 
place it in the context of the cultural similarities and differences of each country, making 
note of any historic ties between them. To determine cultural distance, lacking a 
comprehensive indicator such as the World Values Survey, I use data from the CIA 
World Factbook to describe the dominant religion, ethnicity, and language of each 
country, as well as its geographic location, GDP per capita (PPP), and type of 
government. I also use Freedom House scores, an index of how free a country is based on 
political rights and civil liberties, and the United Nations Development Program’s Gender 
Inequality Index (GII) which measures from 0 to 1 how unequal women are, with 1 being 
the least equal.  
I go on to analyze the response of the country of settlement at the group level and 
at the state level, including any significant events, policies, and how the situation changed 
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over time. Finally, I assess the level of success of the refugees, attempting to find 
information on social integration indicators like employment, access to education, and 
housing, which varies in availability. The independent variable is the level of cultural 
similarity or difference, while the dependent variables are the indicators of social 
integration. 
I use these case studies in order to assess the relationship between culture and 
settlement as well as the mechanism by which culture might affect settlement. They 
provide more holistic analysis on the impact of cultural distance on integration and take 
into account the histories and particularities of each case. They also provide support for 
and help explain the results of the quantitative analysis and the influence of other factors 




There were 52 unique countries of origin and 28 unique countries of asylum, with 
a total of 58 different countries. With each case consisting of a refugee flow from one 
country of origin to another country of asylum, my data included 609 cases out of a 
population of 3,242 cases. In 2018, a total of150,420 asylum-seekers were denied asylum 
out of 362,786 decisions made, while the average rejection rate was 41.65%. Out of 
these, the most decisions made was on Iraqi refugees to Germany at 36,207 cases, and the 
least amount of decisions was 5 decisions each, which occurred for 154 cases. The 
average GDP per capita PPP was $16,444.92 for countries of asylum and $8,801.56 for 
countries of origin. This shows that refugees tend to originate in less wealthy countries 
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and seek asylum in more wealthy countries. The smallest GDP for all countries was 
Rwanda at $773 and the largest was Qatar at $68,794. 
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Control GDP per capita 
PPP (Countries 
of Asylum) 




The minimum measurement of cultural distance is 0.01, between Colombia and 
Ecuador. The maximum cultural distance is 0.79, between Jordan and Sweden. The 
average distance is 0.25, and the standard deviation is about 0.14. This means that 68% of 
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measurements are between 0.11 and 0.39. This data is left leaning, showing that countries 
tend to have more similar cultures as measured by the WVS data. 
Chart 3 
 
The average rate of refugees rejected to total decisions made was 41.65%. The 
highest rate of rejections was 100%, which occurred in 81 cases with distinct countries of 
origin and of residence/asylum. The lowest rate was 0% which occurred for almost 200 
cases. Notably, in 2018, Turkey rejected zero Iraqi asylum seekers out of 31,974 
applicants. The standard deviation for the rejection rate was 36.46%, meaning that 68% 
of all cases had a rejection rate between 5.19% and 78.11%. This demonstrates that 
rejection rates tend to lean on the lower side. 
Statistical Regression 
 My independent variable, cultural distance, is named “CULDIS.” “Asylum_GDP” 
is the control variable, representing the GDP per capita PPP of the countries of asylum. I 
attempt to establish a relationship between cultural distance and “Rejection” – the 
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rejection rate of asylum seekers. The coefficient for cultural distance is negative and 
small, with a p-value of 0.072 which is significant at the 10% level and a standard error 
of 0.12, indicating the average distance that values fell from the regression line. For the 
control variable, the coefficient is negative and extremely small, with a standard error of 
0.00013 which means that on average, most values fall very close to the regression line. 
The p-value, however, was 0.943, which is not significant. 
 Table 1: Regression Table  







 Asylum_GDP -9.3 e-06 
(0.000) 
 
 Constant 0.07  






 Note: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
The regression analysis shows that, even when controlling for GDP per capita 
(PPP), cultural distance has a weak but significant and negative effect on asylum 
rejection. This would imply a relationship in which, as cultural distance increases, the 
rate of rejection decreases slightly. I expected a positive relationship in which an increase 
in cultural distance leads to an increase in the rate of rejection. GDP also has a negative, 
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very weak, and not significant effect on asylum rejection. This does not support the first 
hypothesis, that higher cultural distance will lead to less successful legal integration. The  
This analysis is limited in that it only looks at legal factors of integration and 
relies on asylum rejection data alone. One barrier to this analysis was the lack of cross-
national, reliable data on multiple measures of legal integration such as legal ability of 
refugees to gain citizenship, employment, and housing. The case studies to follow 
provide much more detailed information on non-legal measures of integration and use the 
data available for each case. 
Case Studies 
Case 1: Salvadoran Refugees to the United States 
 In the first case, I take a look at the refugee flow from El Salvador to the United 
States, which occurred largely between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s, yet which 
persists to present day.53 I first discuss the independent variable, cultural distance, then 
provide in-depth context, including the circumstances in El Salvador that caused 
migration. Then I investigate the mechanisms of integration by looking at the state-level 
and population-level reactions in the United States. Finally, to assess the social 
integration of refugees, I look at brief snapshots of refugees that worked with the 
International Rescue Center, one in-depth literary first-hand account from the book 
Unaccompanied, and numerical indicators of successful refugee integration. 
Salvadorans generally identified as “very different” from the typical American, 
which reflects the high cultural difference between El Salvador and the United States. El 
Salvador was not included in the World Values Survey, but there are identifiable cultural 
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differences. According to the CIA World Factbook, Salvadorans are primarily Spanish-
speaking, 50% Roman Catholic and 36% Protestant.54  El Salvador is a presidential 
republic with a Freedom House score of “Partly Free” and a GII score of 0.40.55 The 
GDP per capita in 2017 was $8,000, with the fourth largest economy in Central 
America.56 Meanwhile, 78.2% of Americans speak only English and are 46.5% 
Protestant and 20.6% Roman Catholic. It has a Freedom House score of “Free” and a GII 
score of 0.18.57 The US GDP per capita was $59,000, and it is a constitutional federal 
republic in North America.58 This information indicates that there are some similarities 
but significant cultural differences between US and Salvadoran culture. 
 In the late 1900s, political unrest in the Northern Triangle – Nicaragua, El 
Salvador, and Guatemala – led to millions of persons becoming displaced.59 In El 
Salvador, inequality and military-oligarchy rule had led to a civil war, and fraudulent 
elections in 1972 led to widespread protests and the emergence of guerrilla warfare 
through organized rebels.60 Between 1979-1982, there was a series of reform-minded but 
ultimately unsuccessful military juntas, and the Salvadoran national security agencies 
were violently suppressing rebellion including private paramilitary “death squads.”61 The 
United States maintained support for centrists but failed to pull military aid to the 
repressive government, despite international outcry and the 1981 massacre of largely 
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children, and facilitated the election of Duarte.62 Refugees first fled to nearby countries 
like Costa Rica and Honduras, but once those countries filled up, they sought refuge in 
the US, Mexico, and Canada.63 While the United States hosted the largest number, there 
was significant anti-immigrant backlash in the 1980s in the form of restrictive policy. 
Under both the Reagan and H. W. Bush administrations, the US attempted to deny that 
Salvadorans were truly refugees, thereby failing to offer adequate protections.64 
 In 1981 the UNHCR recommended that all Salvadorans that fled since 1980 be 
considered refugees due to political displacement and likelihood of suffering if forced to 
return. The 1983 non-binding Cartagena declaration defined refugees as "persons who 
have fled their country because their lives, safety, or liberty have been threatened by 
generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human 
rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.”65 However, 
the United States continued to consider migrants from the Northern Triangle as economic 
migrants rather than refugees, in part to avoid the legal responsibilities to protect refugees 
and in part to avoid admitting to fault in having provided military aid for so long.66 In El 
Salvador, the guerrillas and government agreed to a settlement in 1991 turning the 
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) into a legitimate presence in the 
legislature; however, the party of the death squad leaders continued to dominate 
politics.67 
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 The US political response failed to adequately protect refugees. There was 
significant Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) interference with the right to 
apply for asylum reported.68 In the 1980s and 90s, anti-immigrant backlash led to several 
restrictive bills, though there was a significant pro-refugee response by American civil 
society and especially by the Catholic church, who provided sanctuary for refugees.69 
The Reagan and Bush Sr. administrations supported safe haven for nonconvention 
refugees verbally but excluded Central Americans from such consideration in practice, 
and from 1983-1990 only 2.6% of Salvadoran asylum applicants were successful. The 
INS was encouraged to expedite deportation, bail bonds were increased from one 
hundred dollars to up to $7,500 USD, and detention centers filled up in which abuses 
were common. Abuses included sexual abuse of women and children, theft, and denial of 
access to legal counsel and translated legal documents; some refugees were even drugged 
to coerce them to sign forms.70 The INS was sued several times and ruled against, but 
they continued to violate court rulings.71 Actions and lawsuits by nongovernmental 
organizations achieved some concessions and a 1987 Supreme Court ruling which 
slightly broadened standards for asylum; however, deportations were intentionally sped 
up under Bush Sr.72 It was only in 1990-1991 that court settlements and legislation truly 
improved the ability of Salvadorans to gain legal status, though it is important to note that 
these changes were often limited to Salvadorans and not extended to Nicaraguans and 
Guatemalans seeking asylum.73 
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 The International Rescue Center (IRC) provides resources for refugees in the US 
including resources for seeking legal status but also employment and education. 
Valentina is a Salvadoran who was a senior college student with a major in psychology 
when she left El Salvador and entered the US under the Central American Minors 
program to reunite with her family, including her father who had temporary protection 
status.74 She describes how gangs practiced indiscriminate violence and extortion, and 
how gang members targeted her mother for extortion. The IRC provided legal assistance 
for her and her father, who was also threatened by gang members. Individual accounts of 
refugees are very important to understand the nature of migration. They show how 
difficult it can be to find and settle in a new country. 
 The IRC also assisted Tomas, who qualified for legal status because Hurricane 
Mitch decimated parts of El Salvador in 1998. He married a Salvadoran woman and 
visited her, and due to her pregnancy and escalating gang violence where she lived, 
Tomas sought help from the IRC to help his wife get protected refugee status. According 
to the IRC, the Trump administration announced in 2018 that the Temporary Protected 
Status program for Salvadorans would end in 2019, a move which has been blocked by 
the courts but is under appeal and leaves refugees like Tomas and Valentina in a state of 
uncertainty.75 These accounts show a lack of consistent and positive policy for legal 
integration by the government and a positive impact by civil society, as the IRC attempts 
to help refugees navigate legal barriers. 
Unaccompanied was written in 2018 by Javier Zamora, a Salvadoran refugee, 
about his journey from El Salvador to the United States when he was just nine years 
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old.76 Zamora writes that he feels he can never return and that he felt pressure to marry 
for papers against his wishes, which shows how legal barriers can create hard choices and 
social pressure.77 He writes how his experience with violence as a child, both familial 
violence and gang violence, led him to have violent episodes when he became intoxicated 
as an adult.78 This is a psychological impact of trauma that ideally, the government of the 
country of asylum would create policy to mitigate. 
Zamora also describes his experience with integration and the legal system. About 
receiving a deportation letter, he writes "The words Notice to Appear flap like a monarch 
trapped in a puddle. Translation: ten years in a cell cold enough to be named Hielera.”79 
He describes “waiting in that line at the US embassy when I tried and tried for a visa like 
Mom like Dad like aunts and we all got denied” and that his whole family was “working, 
Mom Dad Tía Lupe Tía Mali working under different names.”80 These experiences 
account for the difficulty and fears involved in obtaining legal status to live and work in 
the US. About the desire to fit in, Zamora says that he “was ready to be gringo speak 
English own a pool Jeep convertible," but that he had “always known this country wanted 
[him] dead.”81 He writes that “more than once a white man wanted me dead a white man 
passed a bill that wants me deported wants my family deported."82 There is a desire to 
integrate and even assimilate, but a feeling of alienation by the government and the 
people around him. 
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As of 2013, Salvadorans spoke more Spanish at home than other Hispanic people 
living in the United States.83 Salvadorans also had lower levels of education and annual 
personal earnings than other US Hispanics and the overall US population. Foreign born 
Salvadorans were less likely to have earned a bachelor’s degree or higher than US-born 
Salvadorans. The poverty rate of Salvadorans is higher than the overall US rate but lower 
compared to other US Hispanics. Salvadorans have less health insurance and lower 
homeownership than all Hispanics and the US population. Meanwhile, approximately 
half of Salvadorans see themselves as “very different” from typical Americans, while 
close to one-third see themselves as typical Americans. This compares to about half of 
Hispanic adults who see themselves as a typical American and 44% who see themselves 
as “very different.” Finally, the US overall employment rate in 2013 was 8.4%, while it 
was 9.9% for Hispanics, 14.6% for US-born Salvadorans, but only 6.8% for foreign-born 
Salvadorans (which may be due to Visa requirements for legal status or be due to 
characteristics of immigrants and refugees in general).84 These statistics paint a generally 
negative picture of social integration outcomes. The cultural distance is high and the 
social integration is poor, which supports the second hypothesis. 
Case 2: Syrian Refugees to Germany 
 In the second case, I discuss the refugees displaced by the Syrian Civil war to 
Germany between 2011 and now.85 First, I describe the cultural distance, then provide the 
context and background behind the Syrian refugee crisis. I then describe the German 
state-level and population-level responses. Finally, to determine the social integration of 
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Syrian refugees, I summarize how language barriers create barriers to health, two 
accounts by refugees from the book Cast Away: True Stories of Survival From Europe's 
Refugee Crisis, and the available measures for successful integration. 
The official language of Germany is German, with several official minority 
languages, and the country is 27.7% Roman Catholic and 25.5% Protestant. The country 
is “Free” according to the Freedom House and has a very low GII of 0.08.86 The GDP per 
capita of Germany was $50,800, and it is a parliamentary republic located in Europe.87 
Syria, meanwhile, is located in the Middle East, with a 2017 GDP per capita of $2,900. 88  
Syria is 87% Muslim, which is the country’s official religion, and the official language is 
Arabic.89 Syria also has a highly authoritarian presidential republic, with a Freedom 
Score of “Not Free” and a GII of 0.55.90 There is clearly a high degree of cultural 
difference. 
 The Syrian refugee crisis was fueled by civil war that has been ongoing since 
2011 and escalated in 2014-15. The war began with anti-government protests which 
escalated into a larger conflict between anti-government forces, including militants from 
the Islamic State, and the repressive Bashar al-Assad regime.91 By the end of 2014, about 
7.6 million people were internally displaced with 3.7 Syrians having fled Syria.92 While 
the vast majority of Syrians resettled in the region, about 6% sought asylum in Europe, 
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North America, and the Asia Pacific between 2011 and 2014.93 The long-lasting nature of 
the conflict has created unique challenges for Syrian refugees, including tensions among 
host community populations and difficulty meeting their basic needs.94 
 In 2013, Germany began a new program to admit Syrian refugees, and granted 
asylum to the largest number of Syrians from 2012 to 2014 – about 40,000.95 However, 
the magnitude of the crisis was overblown both in comparison to previous migration 
levels96 and the 3.7 million registered refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, and 
Turkey.97 Merkel opened the country strategically, both as a way to repair Germany’s 
reputation with refugees and to overcome stagnant population growth to increase the size 
of the work force.98 Syrian refugees were unique in that they were much more educated 
than other refugee groups and, while most did not speak German, many spoke English, 
which could be a factor making social integration easier.99 
 Germany also invested significant resources in the integration of Syrian refugees, 
including university scholarships, access to government assistance, language training 
programs which included German culture and history.100 The government policies were 
overall positive and aimed towards long-term integration of refugees, with heavy 
investment in their success. However, there are aspects in which the German response 
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was lacking. The routes to legal status were complicated, numerous, and unequal, with 
recognized refugees receiving full protections and benefits while refugees that entered 
under different means, such as through state programs, did not receive the same 
protections.101 Furthermore, despite excluding anyone with a criminal history and 
screening for and prioritizing asylum-seekers that already spoke German and were 
expected to integrate easily,102 Germany saw xenophobic anti-immigrant responses. 
Germany experienced anti-immigrant protests and a sharp increase in the number of 
verbal and physical assaults against refugees, along with an increase in electoral 
successes by far-right parties running on anti-immigrant platforms.103 This shows exactly 
what I expect: high cultural distance leading to xenophobic responses which in turn 
influence the government. 
 2016 interviews with Syrian refugees reveal that language barriers create barriers 
to adequate healthcare for Syrian refugees. A large number of Syrian refugees in 
Germany experienced some degree of trauma and need mental health care.104 Refugees 
expressed concern about making appointments and understanding directions from 
pharmacists. Many reported that they often had little interactions with locals and were 
isolated with limited options for transportation and therefore did not have the frequent 
opportunity to practice language skills and pick up cultural cues. The government 
provided free German courses; however, these were effectively inaccessible due to very 
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long waiting lists.105 In this way, the positive policy intent of the government was not 
realized. 
 Cast Away: True Stories of Survival From Europe's Refugee Crisis includes the 
personal stories of many Syrian refugees, two of whom set out for Germany. Sina, a 
Chemical Engineer, arrived in Greece with her infant son and registered there with the 
plan of waiting for her husband before making her way to Germany, having received a 
scholarship to study for a Master’s degree.106 However, her husband died in transit. Sina 
decided to make a visa appointment in Germany, but a lawyer at a local charity warned 
her that her son may not be granted a visa, as Sina had not been able to get a death 
certificate proving her husband’s death.107 Fearful, Sina decided to contact a smuggler, 
and for 400 euros, she was transported across Europe. Having stopped in Sweden and 
received warm treatment and assistance from both the government and local residents, 
Sina decided to stay and applied for asylum there, never making it to complete her degree 
in Germany.108 This demonstrates how the legal barrier, a requirement of death certificate 
for her husband, deterred settlement to the point where she never even made it to 
Germany, even though the government attempted to encourage integration by providing 
scholarships. 
 Meanwhile, Nart Bajoi, age 34, arrived in Munich. He recalls hearing other 
Syrians often referring to “Mama Merkel,” who sought to welcome refugees and 
overcome Germany’s history with xenophobia and racism.109 However, Nart arrived 
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before these welcoming policies, and was given a deportation order in 2014 to go back 
the way he came, to Bulgaria. He had an old sports injury that became aggravated by his 
journey to Germany via Bulgaria and over mountains. The German immigration service 
stayed his deportation due to his medical treatment, leaving Nart in a state of uncertainty 
as he sought to appeal his deportation. He attended German lessons and volunteered, but 
could not work.110  
In 2015, Merkel suspended the Dublin Regulation, meaning that Nart could stay, 
but he only received temporary suspension of deportation and faced the risk of being 
forced to leave at any time. He was allowed to work with a permit, but thought, “Why 
would someone hire me?...Why would they make a contract with me when perhaps 
tomorrow or the day after tomorrow I would be sent back?” He eventually got a job at a 
US Army base, but had to leave when they asked for his passport after several months. 
The author wrote that “the rules seemed to be changing every month, and Nart had no 
idea what to do or how to try and build a life.”111 
After a while, Nart attempted to return to Syria, unable to work, in a state of legal 
uncertainty, and with his injury aggravated by the cold. He took a bus to the border of 
Austria. However, Hungary had erected several border walls and heavily restricted 
refugee travel through the country, which had the unintended effect of preventing Nart 
from returning to Syria, and Nart turned back to remain in Germany.112 He eventually got 
a job at a gas station after several months and thousands of emails to potential 
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employers.113 Nart’s story demonstrates the negative impact of inconsistent policies on 
settlement, despite significant effort by the refugee. 
There is limited accessible data on social indicators that is specific to Syrian 
refugees to Germany. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) did 
publish a survey of refugee religious practices in 2020. According to this survey, 87.3% 
of Syrian refugees practice Islam, and 75% of Muslim refugees to Germany said that 
religion is important or very important for their happiness and well-being, although only 
28% of Muslim refugees reported attending a religious event at least once a month 
compared to 67% of Christian refugees.114 According to the report, lower participation 
could be due to a lack of suitable religious infrastructure such as an Arabic-speaking 
mosque community. This shows how a key cultural difference may lead refugees to find 
it more difficult to integrate into society, lacking a spiritual community to join. 
A separate BAMF survey of all refugees in 2016 provides several relevant social 
indicators, and in 2016, Syrians made up about 56% of all German refugees and 17% of 
all German asylum seekers.115 Given the limited data, I generalize the outcomes for all 
refugees to Syrian refugees. The BAMF found that refugees had more in common with 
the German population than with the populations of their countries of origin.116 Refugees 
that had lived in Germany longer reported better proficiency in German.117 The report 
notes that 2/3 of the respondents had attended at least one type of language course, such 
as those offered by the German government. Analysis also found that there was a positive 
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correlation between language proficiency gains and education levels and living in private 
accommodations rather than refugee shelters; however, the correlations were negative for 
women respondents.118 This illustrates that for most refugees, improvement in German 
language skills led to better social integration as indicated by housing. However, for 
women, this may be indicative of additional barriers to housing for refugee women that 
the government did not account for. 
14% of respondents were employed, 1/3 of whom were employed part time. 
Employment rates were higher for refugees that had arrived earlier and had thus lived in 
Germany longer. 55% of respondents were still waiting for a decision on their asylum 
claims, which may have impacted their access to the job market.119 Additionally, 
refugees were more satisfied with their health than non-immigrants, though the report 
points out that refugees had a much lower age demographic. The BAMF also found that 
refugees suffered more from loneliness and depression than non-immigrants. Finally, 
only 10% of refugees reported having experienced discrimination “frequently” and 36% 
reported having “seldom” experienced discrimination. Furthermore, refugees living in 
shelters encountered discrimination more frequently than those living in private 
residences, and refugees whose asylum application was approved felt discriminated 
against less often. However, interestingly, refugees with a better proficiency in German 
felt discriminated against more often.120 These social measures show mixed prospects for 
refugees’ social integration, with a positive outlook for employment and physical health 
but negative indicators for mental health and discrimination. The cultural distance was 
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fairly high and the social integration is good, which does not support the second 
hypothesis. 
Case 3: Burmese (Rohingya) Refugees to Bangladesh 
 The third case concerns the Rohingya refugees fleeing Myanmar due to ethnic 
violence, the majority of whom now reside in refugee camps in Bangladesh. While this 
crisis has its roots in the 1982 Citizenship Law which denied citizenship to the Rohingya, 
the violence causing mass refugee flows began in 2017 and has continued to present 
day.121 First, I lay out the cultural distance between the Rohingya and Bangladesh, then I 
provide a brief history of the ethnic violence against the Rohingya. I determine the 
success of refugee integration using three first-hand accounts from refugees in Camp 18 
in Bangladesh, collected by Doctors Without Borders in 2018, and several numerical 
indicators of refugee integration. 
 Bangladesh is also not included in the World Values Survey, nor is Myanmar. 
Bangladesh is 89.1% Muslim and 10% Hindi, with 98.8% of the population speaking the 
official language of Bangla. The Freedom House classifies it as “Partly Free,” and it has a 
GII score of 0.54.122 Bangladesh is part of South Asia and a parliamentary republic with a 
2017 GDP per capita of $4,200.123 Myanmar is a parliamentary republic with an official 
language is Burmese. 87.9% of the population is Buddhist and only 4.3% is Muslim, 
though the refugees fleeing to Bangladesh are Rohingya Muslims. Myanmar is “Not 
Free” and has a GII score of 0.46.124 Myanmar is part of Southeast Asia and had a GDP 
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per capita of $6,300.125 The two countries have similar levels of wealth, are within the 
same region, have somewhat high gender inequality, and are not “Free.” Rohingya 
Muslims share the same religion that is dominant to Bangladesh, and both countries have 
official state languages. Both are parliamentary republics, though the Burmese 
government is increasingly dominated by military authorities. There are some differences 
between the two, but significant cultural similarities, prominently religious. 
 The Rohingya are an ethnic group located in Myanmar, largely concentrated in 
the Rakhine State to the west. The country is majority-Buddhist, and the Rohingya are a 
Muslim minority group. Myanmar was conquered by Britain in 1824 and ruled until 
1948. During this period, many Muslims from Bengal migrated into Myanmar. After 
British rule ended and post-WWII, the British promised the Rohingya an autonomous 
state for their help in the war. This autonomous state never materialized, and the majority 
Burmese Buddhist population has fostered resentment for the perceived invasion.126 
 Myanmar was under military rule for decades, throughout which the Rohingya 
and other ethnic and religious minorities faced discrimination and abuse, until an election 
in 2015. Despite the high hopes for this election and the new President, Nobel Peace 
Prize democracy champion Aung San Suu Kyi, persecution of the Rohingya as well as 
military power and influence continue. Long-running ethnic violence against the 
Rohingya was escalated in 2017, when satellite images were released showing evidence 
of villages in Myanmar being burned down.127 The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army 
launched attacks on security force posts, to which the Myanmar military responded by 
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targeting villages, with what Amnesty International describes as a deliberate and 
intentional pattern of burning targeting Rohingya homes and mosques. There has been 
arrests and tortures of Rohingya men and boys as well as massacres and rapes. Amnesty 
International has labelled the state violence as ethnic cleansing, as has the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights.128 
 Doctors Without Borders, or Medecins Sans Frontieres, is a medical humanitarian 
aid organization working within the refugee camps in Bangladesh. They published first-
hand accounts including translated video interviews with three Rohingya refugees living 
in Camp 18, one of 22 camps in the Kutupalong-Balikhali area in Bangladesh, which 
provides shelter for over 29,300 refugees129. The refugees interviewed are Mohamed, 
Hasina, and Fatima. Mohamed is 45, a father, and a daily laborer. He arrived with 7 other 
family members, including his wife and children, after one of his sons went missing in 
Myanmar. Doctors Without Borders says that, because aid distribution is sometimes 
unequal, those refugees that are able to find casual work do better for themselves. 
Mohamed works occasionally and bought a phone to contact his brother who is in hiding 
in the forest in Myanmar. He is near a water point; according to Doctors Without 
Borders, families in newer camps find wells and latrines few and far between.130  
Hasina is 35 and a widow who arrived in Bangladesh with five children. The 
closest water point to Hasina is non-functional, so she has to walk to the next-closest one. 
She also has to go out to the forest to collect firewood for cooking, a process that can take 
up to three hours. Some refugees were given small gas stoves, but Hasina was one of the 
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many who were not. Hasina is worried about the monsoon season causing the destruction 
of her shelter, which is constructed of bamboo and plastic sheeting. The supplies and 
instructions are provided by aid workers, but refugees construct the shelters themselves. 
In the video interview, Hasina said, “We didn’t come here for the food. We came because 
the Buddhists were killing and setting on fire our parents and brothers. ...We endured 
constant oppression for so long. We came to this country to seek justice and the freedom 
to practice our religion."131 
 Fatima is also a widow, and a mother of four. She couldn’t construct her shelter 
herself and relied on the Rohingya leader in charge of her section to gather volunteers to 
help her build it. Fatima had fled Myanmar in 1992 to avoid forced labor and returned 2 
years later, rebuilding her life, but was forced to leave Myanmar for Bangladesh again in 
2017. According to Doctors Without Borders, there are 5 hospitals, 10 health posts, and 2 
health centers in the camp. Fatima's son was diagnosed with mumps at one of the camp's 
clinics. Fatima reported that “When it became so dangerous again, we came here. It's a 
Muslim country, we can hope for justice here. This country has given us shelter. We are 
grateful to them...We're receiving more help than when we were here last time. Last time, 
we weren't given floor mats or anything. This time, they've given us a floor mat, clothes, 
utensils, and food, rice, oil."132 
 The interviews from Doctors Without Borders demonstrates a lack of investment 
from the Bangladeshi government, which is strained for resources. The majority of 
integration efforts seem to be coming from international organizations. The interviews 
also show how the ability to find work, which the government has restricted, can be very 
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important. They also show that current resources are insufficient and inconsistently 
distributed. Furthermore, two of the interviewees mention that being in a Muslim country 
has been a positive factor for them, indicating that on the specific cultural similarity of 
religion, there is a positive effect on the refugees. 
 Bangladesh has created legal restrictions to discourage long-term settlement of 
refugees and has attempted to encourage repatriation several times.133 This has included 
banning formal education in refugee camps, leaving refugees with access only to 
informal, non-certificate education 2 hours a day and 70% of Rohingya children out of 
school. Refugees are also denied access to formal refugee status and legal employment 
outside refugee camps.134 The latter has led to a corrupt illegal economy in the camps and 
economic competition with local Bangladesh citizens, as Rohingya are willing to work 
for lower wages. This shows a somewhat negative reaction by the local population, 
though the reaction is more driven by the state of the economy than any apparent cultural 
factors. More importantly, the education and employment policies of the government are 
extremely negative and intended to discourage long-term integration, most likely due to 
economic considerations and a limited capacity. 
Furthermore, the refugee camps provide living conditions that do not meet 
international standards, and there have been 420 cases of human trafficking of refugees 
from camps, especially women and children, between December 2018 and June 2019.135 
These incidents show a lack of ability or intent by the government to protect refugees and 
provide for their physical security. The lack of permanent housing is of primary concern. 
 




The cultural distance is very low and the social integration is poor, which does not 
support the second hypothesis. 
Case 4: Venezuelan Refugees to Colombia 
 Finally, the fourth case concerns the Venezuelan refugees to Colombia. First, I 
compare the cultures of the two countries and summarize migration between Venezuela 
and Colombia, including the current crisis. I then analyze the social integration of 
refugees using first-hand accounts and indicators of refugee integration.  
 Venezuela has a variety of ethnicities, including European, Arab, African, and 
indigenous. The South American country’s official language is Spanish, though there are 
some indigenous dialects, and 96% of Venezuelans are Roman Catholic.136 It is a federal 
presidential republic with an increasingly repressive authoritarian leader, classified as 
“Not Free” by Freedom House.137 Venezuela has a GII score of 0.46, and in 2017, had a 
GDP per capita (PPP) of $12,500.138 Colombia is located in South America, sharing 
much of its eastern border with Venezuela. Colombia’s official language is also Spanish, 
and 79% of the population is Roman Catholic (14% are Protestant).139 Colombia is a 
“Partly Free” presidential republic with a GII score of 0.41 and a 2017 GDP per capita 
PPP of $14,400.140 While Colombia is slightly more progressive and developed, the two 
countries are culturally very similar. 
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 Colombia and Venezuela have a very intertwined history, beginning with their 
liberation from Spain under Simon Bolivar.141 During the last half of the twentieth 
century, the two have had territorial disputes, tensions over Venezuelan support of 
Colombian terrorist group FARC, and contention with Colombia’s military-antiterrorism 
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with the United States.142 Additionally, 
Colombians have long made up a significant portion of migrants to Venezuela, including 
undocumented or illegal migrants, and the two also have strong historical trade ties.143 
There was a period of restricted trade in the mid-2000s following the DCA, but the two 
nations have a free trade agreement and are both members of the Organization of 
American States, the Andean Community of Nations, and the Group of Three (G-3).144 
The two have also participated in a border commission in the 1990s which has helped 
reduce tensions, and the presidents both worked to restore relations in the mid-2000s.145 
 Venezuela has long been heavily dependent on oil exports, and a sharp decline in 
oil prices in 2013 created a rapid economic crash and rapidly spiraling inflation.146 While 
the price of oil has since risen, production in Venezuela has continued to fall due to 
continued government mismanagement. This has been accompanied by serious 
infrastructure failures including frequent power outages. In 2017, the government created 
the Special Action Forces to respond to crime and drug trafficking, which has carried out 
extrajudicial killings primarily in poor neighborhoods.147 Venezuelans have thus been 
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fleeing not only due to the humanitarian crisis, but also due to political persecution and 
violence. 
 33% of Venezuelan refugees fled to neighboring Colombia, numbering 1.4 
million as of August 2019 and making up the largest portion in comparison to other 
destination countries.148 Furthermore, 46% of Venezuelans still living in Venezuela have 
considered leaving the country, meaning that the government of Colombia anticipates 
millions more refugees by the end of 2020. Over 400,000 of these refugees are native 
Colombians that originally sought refuge in Venezuela.149 The Colombian government 
has committed to maintaining open borders for ethical reasons, but also out of 
reciprocity, noting that Venezuela took in approximately 2.5 million Colombian refugees 
in the past.150 In this way, their shared history contributes to positive sentiment and 
policy response by the Colombian government. 
Venezuelans are not conventional refugees, but like in the case of Salvadoran 
refugees, the UNHCR has called for the recognition of Venezuelans as refugees under the 
Cartagena Declaration.151 Compared to similar crises, this has not received much support 
from the international community. International aid for the Syrian refugee crisis was 
significantly higher, amounting to about $1,500 per refugee, whereas for Venezuelans it 
comes out to $125 each.152 This has resulted in significant strain on the host countries, 
including Colombia. Colombia’s economic limitations may affect their ability to enact 
policies to invest in refugees. However, they have generally still made positive efforts. 
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 The Colombian response has included relaxing entry regulations, creating the 
Special Stay Permit (PEP) to grant the rights to work, education, and healthcare, and over 
$230 million in credit lines to invest in infrastructure and more for areas with high 
densities of refugees.153 Over half of Venezuelans have some sort of permit or visa, but 
47% either entered through an unregulated port or overstayed their permit and do not 
have legal status. The Colombian government is committed to maintaining open borders 
and has developed a Comprehensive Migration Response Policy Agenda which includes 
the goals of providing access to healthcare and education, protecting vulnerable groups 
(indigenous people, women, and children), economic integration, and security and social 
cohesion. This shows a policy plan to provide for the successful social integration of 
refugees and create a framework for legal integration. 
 The existence of a comprehensive plan and government investment has helped 
integration, although the limited capacity in comparison to the large influx of refugees 
has led to gaps. Over 200,000 Venezuelan children are enrolled in school with 117,000 
receiving school meals; however, there is significant need for investment in 
infrastructure, training for teachers, and psychosocial support.154 The government is 
spending 3.2 million per month on emergency care for Venezuelans, including 
facilitating pregnancies of women that hadn’t received prenatal care or vitamins and 
providing millions of vaccines at the border, especially to children. There are concerns 
 
153 UNHCR “Labor Market Access and Integration,” 2019; Bahar and Dooley, “Venezuela refugee crisis to 
become the largest and most underfunded in modern history,” 2019. 
154 Migration Policy, ““The Colombian Response to the Venezuelan Migration Crisis: A Dialogue with 
Colombia’s Migration Czar,” 2019. 
51 
about resurfacing of diseases such as measles and rising STDs, and deficits in water, 
sanitation, and housing in border regions.155 
 While most refugees have settled in urban areas, refugees in remote border 
regions have had difficulties accessing resources.156 While Colombia initially provided 
temporary shelters and avoided building formal refugee camps, the UNHCR did build a 
shelter in Maicao, in the remote La Guajira desert where resources are limited, with a 
Red Cross clinic, a cafeteria, a day care, and experts providing psychological counseling 
and legal advice, all free. Refugees can only stay a month, but the free shelter and food 
provide an opportunity for refugees to save up so they can rent once they move out.157 
Thus, the response by the international community, while financially not comparable to 
other refugee crisis, has been positively supplementing the government’s attempts to 
integrate refugees. 
 In interviews with World Vision, an organization providing food aid to refugees, 
Venezuelan refugee Mariairene describes her current situation in Colombia. Her oldest 
son was able to find work on a trial basis and earns $100 per month, and she says that for 
herself and the other 9 people living in a 3-room rental, “it is a challenge to survive on 
that income.”158 They cook over a wood fire, and plant food in the backyard. A different, 
unnamed refugee leading a group of other migrants, including children, says, “since we 
crossed into Colombia, people have been very helpful and kind to us.”159 These accounts 
demonstrate that there is existing support, and people are able to get by, but there are still 
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significant challenges. Sandra Arriesta is a native Colombian. She says, “I moved to 
Venezuela when times were bad here. I never thought I’d come back here.”160 Her story 
is a demonstration of the cultural and historical overlap between the two countries. 
 The indicators for social and legal integration are mixed for Venezuelan refugees, 
with a somewhat positive outlook. Over half have legal status, which provides the ability 
to find work, and for the most part have found settlement in cities rather than refugee 
camps. There is a high rate of vaccinations, and children are being integrated into the 
public school system. However, economic and infrastructure limitations, along with the 
severity of the crisis, mean that there are also poor outcomes. Diseases are of high and 
increasing concern, and refugees in rural areas do not have access to resources. The 
Colombian population, which was initially mostly in favor of accepting refugees, has an 
increasingly negative perception of the Venezuelans; although the government has 
recognized this and persists in maintaining welcoming policies. For the purposes of 
analysis, the outcome can be said to be slightly positive, as the Colombian government’s 
efforts are paying off, albeit not all at once and with insufficient resources. The cultural 
distance is low and the social integration is fairly good, which supports the second 
hypothesis. 
Results 
 The following chart breaks down the findings of the case studies. The case studies 
show mixed results for both the countries that are culturally similar and the countries that 
are culturally different. The chart demonstrates how policy responses and population 
responses interact with state capacity to create differing outcomes. 
 




 The case studies confirm that the countries’ capacity to accept refugees is clearly 
a very large determinant of integration, which is made evident by the cases of Bangladesh 
and Colombia where limitations in economic and infrastructure capacities are preventing 
successful integration. In Bangladesh, the government and the people had a negative 
response, seeking short-term integration, and the only clear positive effect of cultural 
similarity has been that the Rohingya are experiencing newfound freedom to practice 
Islam. In Colombia, the government has had a very positive response, while the people 
had an initially positive but now somewhat negative response. Colombia has made efforts 
to integrate refugees dispersed throughout the country and provide legal status and ability 
to work, while in Bangladesh refugees are concentrated in camps with insufficient 
resources and low work prospects. A key difference in the cases is that, while both 
countries are developing, Bangladesh has a GDP per capita (PPP) that is lower than that 
of Colombia by $10,200. 
Among the two case studies in which the countries of asylum have high capacity, 
the US had a negative government response and positive population response whereas 
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Germany had a positive government response and negative population response, and 
Syrian refugees have much better outcomes compared to Salvadorans. Based on the case 
study information, the Syrian refugees to Germany were more culturally similar than the 
Salvadoran refugees to the US. There is some limited evidence supporting my 
hypotheses. Furthermore, the case of Syrians to Germany highlights how the existing 
cultural differences can spark a xenophobic public response, followed by a political shift 
towards more xenophobia, and make integration more difficult. The case of Rohingya in 
Bangladesh, meanwhile, highlights how, in a situation with very poor integration 
outcomes, the commonality of religion creates a tie that is positive for refugees. 
It seems that there are certain circumstances in which culture is significant: a high 
capacity combined with significant government investment in the settlement of refugees 
can overcome the negative population response and a high cultural distance (Germany), 
whereas a high capacity and positive population response cannot similarly overcome a 
negative response by the government due to high cultural distance (US). When there is a 
low cultural distance, an extremely low capacity can completely outweigh any cultural 
impact (Bangladesh), and the policy and population-level implications of a poor economy 
lead to very poor integration outcomes. However, when economic limitations are less 
severe, low cultural distance can directly lead to positive policy responses that produce 
better outcomes (Colombia). 
Conclusions 
 This research intends to address the role of culture in refugee settlement, 
combining social psychology and with political analysis. I argue that when two cultures 
interact in the form of refugees settling in a new country of residence, the differences 
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between those two cultures are an important predictor of how welcoming the country of 
residence will be as well as how policymakers will respond, ultimately determining the 
ability of the refugee to successfully settle in the country. Xenophobia and in-group/out-
group thinking are very powerful, and when they determine the behavior and policy 
response to refugees, it can negatively impact the acculturation process and limit their 
access to important resources. When refugees have very different cultures from their 
country of settlement, I expect that people will respond negatively, rather than with a 
culture of welcome, and policy makers will focus on short-term management and 
restrictive policies, rather than long-term integration with social resources and legal 
protections. 
 There is insufficient literature on the role of culture in refugee integration and 
well-being, and data limitations have created a dearth of quantitative analysis. Political 
scientists have mostly focused on single case studies and have predominantly looked at 
economic and security factors and the role of policy. The research is inconclusive on 
what helps refugees integrate successfully. Meanwhile, social identity theory provides a 
basis for the characteristics of the refugees, including their ethnicity and culture, as a 
determinant of the public response to refugees. Psychology and sociology give context on 
refugee acculturation, confirming that the public response and access to resources are 
important for integration and providing the concept of cultural distance.  
I chose to address data limitations and remedy the lack of quantitative research by 
relying on nested analysis as a tool for mixed-methods comparative research. This type of 
analysis allows synergy between small-N case studies and large-N statistical analysis 
where limitations exist, addressing more fully alternative explanations while allowing for 
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more confidence in the findings. Data on refugee integration is very limited and 
inconsistent; the most reliable cross-country data is on asylum applications. This captures 
only the legal aspect of integration and serves to primarily assess the first hypothesis as 
well as to show preliminary significance of the independent variable. Cultural distance 
has been measured using data from the World Values Survey, based on precedent set by 
Welzel and Inglehart, while the dependent data measures the country of settlement’s rate 
of rejections of asylum applicants in 2018 from individual countries of origin of refugees. 
This is the most reliable data on decisions made on asylum applications. Finally, the case 
studies that have been selected include a broad geographic range and include very 
different circumstances, allowing for more confidence in generalization of results. 
The quantitative results did not support my first hypothesis, as the regression 
showed that, controlling for GDP, there was a significant relationship in the negative 
direction. This would mean that an increase in cultural distance resulted in lower 
rejection rates. The quantitative results may be explained in several ways. First, GDP 
may have such a strong effect as to completely outweigh the effects of cultural distance, 
which would be supported by the case study findings. Second, for those countries where 
refugees are extremely culturally different, that might show that those refugees have 
travelled farther distances, which may occur only when the refugee is fairly certain of 
their chances of receiving refugee status or only when the refugee crisis is extremely far 
reaching and thus more pressure is on countries to honor refugee status. Third, the aspects 
of culture that make integration more difficult may be attributable more to perceived, 
rather than actual, cultural difference, especially since xenophobia is not rooted in reality. 
This would mean that measurement of cultural differences that could lead to xenophobic 
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responses should be rooted in perception and/or the visible aspects of culture such as 
attire, skin color, language and accent, etc, rather than more abstract aspects of culture 
rooted in individual people as the World Values Survey measured. 
In future quantitative research on this topic, different aspects of culture should be 
paid attention to account for the perceptions of culture. Furthermore, my analysis was 
limited to 2018. Additional research could both incorporate more years and focus on 
analysis by country over the course of several decades. Another area of further 
investigation could include whether cultural differences impact any particular countries 
more than others: do democracies tend to be more welcoming because of their self-
perception as pro-human rights, or less welcoming because the government is more 
responsive to a xenophobic public? Do culturally diverse countries tend to accept more 
cultural difference than more homogenous countries? Such questions could allow for 
explanations using more independent variables or theoretical mechanisms than I have 
presently explored. 
The case studies somewhat support my hypotheses. They show that low cultural 
distance, when uninhibited by low wealth of the country of asylum, can result in positive 
outcomes, and that countries with very high capacity can be very influenced by cultural 
distance to have negative outcomes. The case studies show that wealth is an extremely 
significant factor, but not the sole predictor of outcomes, and that the population can have 
xenophobic responses both due to cultural distance and due to economic factors. They 
also show that high investment and policies geared towards long-term settlement can 
mostly overcome cultural distance; although this result shows that my independent 
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variable is not a primary predictor of outcomes, this is a positive finding as it means that 
refugees fleeing to very culturally different countries are not doomed to poor outcomes. 
Further research could also focus on how the role of culture changes over time 
with the impact of contact and of refugee adaptation. Additional case studies could 
identify ways in which refugees are culturally distinct from the population of their 
country of origin, and how government policies can account for and overcome cultural 
differences to better integrate refugee populations. Ultimately, this research and future 
research should seek to inform policy to make integration better for both refugees and for 
countries accepting refugees, reducing instances of unsafe or unsanitary conditions and 
xenophobic behaviors towards refugees while effectively investing in refugee integration 
as a way to positively impact society and the economy. The ability to make informed 
decisions will be key as climate and conflict create new refugee flows, for the well-being 







"A Profile of the Modern Salvadoran Migrant." US Committee for Refugees and 
Immigrants, December 2013. https://refugees.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/A-
Profile-of-the-Modern-Salvadorean-Migrant-English.pdf. 
“Asylum Seekers (Refugee Status Determination).” UNHCR, n.d. Accessed April 2, 
2020. http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers. 
Berry, John W. "Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation." Applied Psychology: An 
International Review 46, no. 1 (1997): 5-34. doi:10.1080/026999497378467. 
Blakemore, Erin. “Who are the Rohingya people?” National Geographic, February 8, 
2019. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/people/reference/rohingya-
people/#close. 
Bogen, Rachel, and Jay Marlowe. 2019. "Asylum Discourse in New Zealand: Moral 
Panic and a Culture of Indifference." Australian Social Work 1: 105-110. 
Accessed October 2, 2019. https://search-ebscohost-
com.libez.lib.georgiasouthern.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsbl&AN=vdc.10
0048476391.0x000001. 
Brader, Ted, Nicholas A Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay. 2008. "What triggers public 
opposition to immigration? Anxiety, group cues, and immigration threat." 
American Journal of Political Science 52 (4): 959-978. 
Brucker, Herbert, et al. "Forced migration, arrival in Germany, and first steps toward 




Campbell, Bradley. 2009. "Genocide as Social Control." Sociological Theory 27 (2): 150. 
Accessed October 2, 2019. 
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=edsj
sr&AN=edsjsr.40376129. 
“CIA World Factbook - Bangladesh.” CIA, August 4, 2020. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bg.html. 
“CIA World Factbook - Burma.” CIA, August 11, 2020. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html. 
"CIA World Factbook - Colombia." CIA, September 10, 2020. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html. 
"CIA World Factbook – El Salvador." CIA, August 4, 2020. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/es.html. 
“CIA World Factbook - Germany.” CIA, August 11, 2020. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html. 
“CIA World Factbook - Syria.” CIA, August 12, 2020. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html. 
“CIA World Factbook - United States.” CIA, August 18, 2020. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html. 
"CIA World Factbook - Venezuela." CIA, September 10, 2020. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ve.html. 
“Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status and Protection of Refugees.” UNHCR. 
Accessed November 11, 2019. https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10. 
61 
Conrad, Maximilian, and Hugrún Aðalsteinsdóttir. 2017. "Understanding Germany’s 
Short-lived ‘Culture of Welcome’: Images of Refugees in Three Leading German 
Quality Newspapers." German Politics & Society 35 (4): 1-21. Accessed October 
2, 2019. doi:10.3167/gps.2017.350401. 
Croucamp, Cameron J, Moira O'Connor, Anne Pedersen, and Lauren J Breen. 2017. 
"Predicting Community Attitudes towards Asylum Seekers: A Multi-Component 
Model." Australian Journal of Psychology 69 (4): 237-246. Accessed October 2, 
2019. doi:10.1111/ajpy.12149. 
Dooley, Meagan, and Bahar Dany. "Venezuela refugee crisis to become the largest and 
most underfunded in modern history." Brookings Institution, December 9, 2019. 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2019/12/09/venezuela-refugee-crisis-to-
become-the-largest-and-most-underfunded-in-modern-history/. 
“Findings and Insights.” World Values Survey Database. Accessed April 2, 2020. 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp. 
García, María C. “Seeking Refuge: Central American Migration to Mexico, the United 
States, and Canada.” Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006. Accessed 
July 8, 2020. 
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=e90
0xww&AN=146991. 
“GDP per capita, PPP (current international $).” The World Bank. Accessed May 22, 
2020. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD. 
62 
"Global Freedom Scores." Freedom House, 2020. Accessed September 27, 2020. 
https://freedomhouse.org/reports/freedom-world/freedom-world-research-
methodology. 
Green, Molly. 2017. "Language Barriers and Health of Syrian Refugees in Germany." 
American Journal of Public Health 107 (4): 486. 
doi:10.2105/AJPH.2016.303676. 
Haggerty, Richard A, and Howard I Blutstein. "Venezuela: a country study." Library of 
Congress: Federal Research Division, 1993. Accessed September 2, 2020. 
https://www.loc.gov/item/92010376/. 
Hudson, Rex A. "Colombia: A Country Study." Library of Congress: Research Division, 
2010. Accessed September 2, 2020. https://www.loc.gov/item/2010009203/. 
"Human Development Data (1990-2018)." United Nations Development Programme, 
2019. Accessed September 27, 2020. http://hdr.undp.org/en/data. 
Hynie, Michaela. 2018. "Refugee Integration: Research and Policy." Peace and Conflict: 
Journal of Peace Psychology, Refugee Integration: Research and Policy 24 (3): 
265-276. Accessed October 2, 2019. doi:10.1037/pac0000326. 
“In El Salvador, you don’t know if you’ll make it home alive at the end of the day.” 
International Rescue Committee. Accessed August 2, 2020. 
https://www.rescue.org/article/el-salvador-you-dont-know-if-youll-make-it-home-
alive-end-day. 
Inglehart, R, et. al. "Values Survey: Round Six - Country-Pooled Datafile Version." 
World Values Survey, Last modified 2014. Accessed November 30, 2019. 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp. 
63 
Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. "Changing Mass Priorities: The Link Between 
Modernization and Democracy." Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 2 (2010): 551-
567. Accessed October 2, 2019. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25698618. 
"Labor Market Access and Integration." UNHCR, January 2019. 
https://www.acnur.org/5c6c1c914.pdf. 
Laurentsyeva, N, and A Venturini. "The Social Integration of Immigrants and the Role of 
Policy--A Literature Review." Intereconomics/Review of European Economic 
Policy 52, no. 5 (2017): 285-292. Accessed October 2, 2019. https://search-
ebscohost-com.libez.lib.georgiasouthern.edu/login.aspx?direct=. 
Lieberman, Evan S. "Nested Analysis as a Mixed Method Strategy for Comparative 
Research." The American Political Science Review 99, no. 3 (2005): 435-452. 
Accessed October 2, 2019. www.jstor.org/stable/30038950. 
“Life in Camp 18: First-hand Accounts from Rohingya Refugees.” Medicins Sans 
Frontieres, July 3, 2018. Accessed August 25, 2020. 
https://msf.lu/en/news/testimonies/life-in-camp-18-first-hand-accounts-from-
rohingya-refugees. 
Lopez, Gustavo. "Hispanics of Salvadoran Origin in the United States, 2013." Pew 
Research Center, September 15, 2013. 
https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2015/09/15/hispanics-of-salvadoran-
origin-in-the-united-states-2013/. 
“Mapping Myanmar's Atrocities Against Rohingya.” Amnesty International, June 27, 
2018.  https://mapping-crimes-against-rohingya.amnesty.org/#01_geo_01. 
64 
Miholjcic, Nina. "What Is Preventing Successful Immigrant Integration in the Central and 
Eastern European Societies?" Journal of Community Positive Practices 19, no. 2 
(2019): 14-24. Accessed October 2, 2019. https://search-ebscohost-
com.libez.lib.georgiasouthern.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=1376556
29. 
Ostrand, Nicole. "The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Comparison of Responses by Germany, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States." Journal on Migration and 
Human Security 3 (2015): 255-279. 
doi:https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=
edsgit&AN=edsgit.A432171109. 
Otis, John. "Venezuelans Find Temporary Lifeline At Colombia's First Border Tent 
Camp." NPR, May 1, 2019. Accessed September 27, 2020. 
https://www.npr.org/2019/05/01/718778333/venezuelans-find-temporary-lifeline-
at-colombias-first-border-tent-camp . 
Phillimore, Jenny. "Refugees, Acculturation Strategies, Stress and Integration." Journal 
of Social Policy 3 (2011): 575. https://search-ebscohost-
com.libez.lib.georgiasouthern.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsgea&AN=edsgc
l.260582263. 
“Population Statistics - Data - Asylum Seekers.” UNHCR. Accessed April 2, 2020. 
http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers. 
Praag, Oriana Van. "Understanding the Venezuelan Refugee Crisis." Wilson Center, 
September 13, 2019. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/understanding-the-
venezuelan-refugee-crisis. 
65 
Reid, Kathryn. "Venezuela migrants share their stories about why they left." World 
Vision, June 25, 2019. Accessed 26 October, 2020. 
https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/venezuela-migrants-share-
their-stories-why-they-left. 
“Rohingya Refugee Crisis Timeline.” USA for UNHCR: The Refugee Agency. Accessed 
July 8, 2020. https://www.unrefugees.org/news/rohingya-refugee-crisis-timeline/. 
Segal, U A. "Globalization, Migration, and Ethnicity." Public Health 172, no. 7 (2019): 
135-142. Accessed October 2, 2019. doi:10.1016/j.puhe.2019.04.011. 
Shahid, Rudabeh. “Assessing the treatment of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh.” 
Atlantic Council, September 25, 2019. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-
research-reports/issue-brief/assessing-the-treatment-of-rohingya-refugees-in-
bangladesh/. 
Siegert, Manuel. "Religious affiliation, religious practice and social integration of 
refugees." Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, February 2020. Accessed 
August 26, 2020. 
https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Forschung/Kurzanalysen/kurzanal
yse2-2020_iab-bamf-soep-befragung-religion.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=8. 
Sniderman, Paul M, Louk Hagendoorn, and Markus Prior. "Predisposing factors and 
situational triggers: Exclusionary reactions to immigrant minorities." American 
Political Science Review 98, no. 1 (2004): 35-49. 
Stephan, Walter G, Oscar Ybarra, and Guy Bachman. "Prejudice Toward Immigrants 1." 
Journal of Applied Social Psychology 29, no. 11 (1999): 2221-2237. 
66 
Streitwieser, Bernhard, Lukas Brueck, Rachel Moody, and Margaret Taylor. "The 
Potential and Reality of New Refugees Entering German Higher Education: The 
Case of Berlin Institutions." European Education 49, no. 4 (2017): 231-52. 
doi:10.1080/10564934.2017.1344864. 
“Syria: The Story of the Conflict.” BBC News, March 11, 2016. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868. 
"The Colombian Response to the Venezuelan Migration Crisis: A Dialogue with 
Colombia's Migration Czar." Migration Policy, September 27, 2019. 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/multimedia/colombian-response-venezuelan-
migration-crisis-dialogue-colombia%E2%80%99s-migration-czar. 
Tometten, Christoph. "Resettlement, Humanitarian Admission, and Family Reunion: The 
Intricacies of Germany’s Legal Entry Regimes for Syrian Refugees." Refugee 
Survey Quarterly 37, no. 2 (2018): 187-203. doi:10.1093/rsq/hdy002. 
“UNHCR - Rohingya Emergency.” UNHCR, July 31, 2019. Accessed August 31, 2020. 
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/rohingya-emergency.html. 
“History of UNHCR Syria.” UNHCR Syria. Accessed July 8, 2020. 
https://www.unhcr.org/sy/history-of-unhcr-syria. 
“UNHCR Asylum and Migration.” UNHCR, November 30, 2019. 
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/asylum-and-migration.html. 
Warner, Cindy, and Gillian Finchelescu. "Living with Prejudice: Xenophobia and Race." 





“What TPS means for a young Salvadoran family.” International Rescue Committee. 
Accessed August 2, 2020. https://www.rescue.org/announcement/what-tps-
means-young-salvadoran-family. 
Zamora, Javier. Unaccompanied. La Vergne: Copper Canyon Press, 2018.  
Zavodny, Madeline. "Determinants of Recent Immigrants Locational Choices." 
International Migration Review 4 (1999): 1014. Accessed October 2, 2019. 
https://search-ebscohost-com.libez.lib.georgiasouthern.edu/login.aspx?direct=. 
